

Group Theory for Cryptology

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Group Algebras, Representations and Computation
International Centre for Theoretical Research - Bengaluru
(joint work with R. Aragona, R. Civino and N. Gavioli)

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
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The permutations corresponding to the keys, called the *encryption functions*, should appear uniformly spread through the set of all the permutations on V .



representation of the cipher in $\text{Sym}(V)$

The homomorphism

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is a *regular* representation of V :

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
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
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In our choice of the encryption functions, we would better **STAY AWAY** from $N_{\text{Sym}(V)}(T)$. Here is a problematic example in which σ was used to choose our encryption function.




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
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
Differential attack



Substitution-Permutation Networks



Confusion and diffusion



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Lemma (John D. Dixon, *Maximal abelian subgroups of the symmetric group*, Can. J. Math. XXIII, 3 (1971), 426-438.)

If G is a finite group any two regular representations of G in $\text{Sym}(G)$ are conjugate.

Proof.

Let $\sigma : G \rightarrow \text{Sym}(G)$ be the right regular representation of the finite group G , and let $\tau : G \rightarrow \text{Sym}(G)$ any regular representation of G . We indicate by g^σ, g^τ the images of $g \in G$ under σ, τ . Let 1 indicate the identity of G .

Now we define a map $\phi : G \rightarrow G$ by $g\phi = 1g^\tau$. The map ϕ is easily seen to be a permutation of G , because τ is a regular representation.

Any cycle of g^σ has the form $(x \ xg \ xg^2 \ \dots \ xg^{o(g)-1})$, and conjugating it by ϕ , and remembering that τ is an isomorphism, we obtain $(1x^\tau \ 1x^\tau g^\tau \ 1x^\tau (g^\tau)^2 \ \dots \ 1x^\tau (g^\tau)^{o(g)-1})$, which is a cycle of g^τ .



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analogously, if $T^\circ = T_\circ < \text{Sym}(V)$ is conjugated to T in $\text{Sym}(V)$,


$$T_\circ = \{\tau_b \mid b \in V\},$$

where τ_b is the unique element in T_\circ which maps 0 into b , then another operation is defined on V as


$$a \circ b \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} a\tau_b$$

It is easy to prove that (V, \circ) is an elementary abelian group, thus isomorphic to $(V, +)$.


Is it possible that the encryption functions are “less non-linear” with respect to \circ than they are with respect to $+$? In other words, should we “stay away” also from the conjugates of $AGL(V)$, when choosing our encryption functions?



Differential attack revisited



A successful example on a toy SPN*



- ▶ distinguishing attack based on classical differences **fails**
- ▶ distinguishing attack based on alternative differences **succeeds**

*R. Civino, C. Blondeau, and M. Sala. *Differential attacks: using alternative operations*. **Designs, Codes and Cryptography**. 2019, 87.2-3: 225-247

Weak-key subspace

$$W_o \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{k \mid k \in V, \forall x \in V \ x \circ k = x + k\} \cong T \cap T_o.$$

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- ▶ consider $T_o < \text{AGL}(V)$

\downarrow^*

$$1 \leq d \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \dim(W_o) \leq n - 2$$

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- ▶ assume $d = n - 2$

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- ▶ $(x + k) \circ ((x \circ \Delta) + k) = \Delta$ half of the times
- ▶ we can exhibit matrices that are linear with respect to \circ as well

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Is the case $d = n - 2$ special?

apparently, yes^{**}!

^{*}R. Aragona, R. Civino, N. Gavioli, C.M.S., *Regular subgroups with large intersection*. **Annali di Matematica Pura ed Applicata**. 2019

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Theorem (R. Aragona, R. Civino, N. Gavioli, C.M.S.)

If $T_{\circ} < \text{Sym}(V)$ is such that $\dim(W_{\circ}) = n - 2$, then $T_{\circ} < \text{AGL}(V)$

- ▶ groups conjugated to T such that $\dim(W_{\circ}) = n - 2$ are called **second-maximal intersection subgroups (2MI)**
- ▶ possible construction of cyphers that are secure with respect to many different \circ -differential attacks

^{*}R. Aragona, R. Civino, N. Gavioli, C.M.S., *Regular subgroups with large intersection*. **Annali di Matematica Pura ed Applicata**. 2019

Sketch of proof: we show first that if an involution $\phi \in \text{Sym}(V)$ does not fix any of the cosets of a subgroup $W \leq V$ of index 4, and centralizes σ_W , then $\phi \in \text{AGL}(V)$. We then observe that T_o is generated by $T \cap T_o$ and two such commuting involutions.

But we were also able to write those involutions in matrix form. This turned out to be crucial in the proof of our next result:

Theorem (A,C,G,S)

Every Sylow 2-subgroup Σ of $\text{AGL}(V)$ contains exactly one 2MI subgroup T_Σ which is normal in Σ

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{AGL}(V) \\ | \\ \Sigma \\ | \\ T_\Sigma \triangleleft \end{array}$$

Theorem (A,C,G,S)

If \bar{T} is a 2MI subgroup, then there exists a Sylow 2-subgroup Σ of $\text{AGL}(V)$ such that $\bar{T} = T_\Sigma \trianglelefteq \Sigma$

Our next result is certainly the most technical of the whole paper. The proof is based on two basic ideas, namely:

- the fact that the Sylow 2-subgroups of $\text{AGL}(V)$ are all isomorphic to the semidirect product of T with the group U_n of the unitriangular matrices, and therefore that they stabilize a flag in T ;
- the canonical embedding of $\text{AGL}(V)$ in $GL(n+1, 2)$.

Theorem (A,C,G,S)

Let \bar{T} be an elementary abelian regular subgroup of a Sylow 2-subgroup Σ of $\text{AGL}(V)$. Then \bar{T} is normal in Σ if and only if $\bar{T} \in \{T, T_\Sigma\}$




The proof consists essentially in showing that \bar{T} is a 2MI subgroup.

Corollary

Every $g \in N_{\text{Sym}(V)}(\Sigma) \setminus \text{AGL}(V)$ interchanges by conjugation T and T_Σ

Corollary

If Σ is a Sylow 2-subgroup of $\text{AGL}(V)$, then $[N_{\text{Sym}(V)}(\Sigma) : \Sigma] = 2$



The fact that the Sylow 2-subgroups of $\text{Sym}(V)$ are self-normalising was already known to P. Hall. Similarly:

Corollary

If Σ is a Sylow 2-subgroup of $\text{AGL}(V)$, then $N_{\text{AGL}(V)}(\Sigma) = \Sigma$. In particular,

$$[\text{AGL}(V) : \Sigma] = \prod_{j=0}^{n-1} (2^{n-j} - 1).$$

is the number of distinct Sylow 2-subgroups of $\text{AGL}(V)$

Next?

- ▶ 2MI subgroups \iff normalisers of Sylow 2-subgroups of $\text{AGL}(V)$

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- ▶ bring this back to crypto again



The Big Problem

