

Mathematics of Program Construction

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Program Correctness

Engineering Design

- **Performance** Functionality, Efficiency, Portability, Modifiability.
- **Correctness** “Product functions reliably as intended.”

Correctness in Software

Improving Reliability of Programs (Software Metrics).

- Testing
- Code walkthrough
- Managing Software Development Process (CMM Maturity Levels)
- n-version programming

Software Crisis Nato Software Engineering Conference in 1960s.

Basis of Correctness

- Mathematical Modelling of Designs
- Analysis and Synthesis Techniques
- Rigorous Mathematical Specification of Products

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Software: Engineering or Craft?

- No rigorous specification of the intended behaviour of the system.
- No mathematical analysis of designs for correctness. Validation is by testing.
- Correctness is implicit and uncertain. Products are unreliable.

Disasters:

- Intel Pentium SRT Division Bug (1995)
(Cost 1 Billion \$).
- Arian 5 Launch Failure (1996)
(Cost 850 Million \$).
- Mars Polar lander (1999) Incomplete requirements.
- Indian PSLV Failed Launch

Changing Face of Hardware and Software

- Multi core processors, new memory models.
- New architectures: clusters, Grids, Multi-agent systems, Service oriented computing
- Concurrent asynchronous modules with mediated interaction

Formal Methods in Programming

- Mathematical Models for program behaviours.
- Logical notations for specifying properties of programs.
- Methods for checking that program meets its desired specification.

Verification Problem

To check whether $M \models \phi$

- M system model in programming/modelling language.
- ϕ property in specification notation.

Must check that **all** behaviours of M satisfy ϕ .

Programs and Assertions

Programs (e expressions, b boolean expr.)

$x := e$

$S1; S2$

if b then S1 else S2 fi

while b do S od

A **State** assigns a value to each variable.

A program starts in an initial state. It ends in a final state or does not terminate.

Assertions

Conditions on state. They specify a subset of states. E.g. $x > y$.
Formally, assertions are formulae of first-order logic.

Assertions use logical connectives.

$P \wedge Q$ P and Q

$P \vee Q$ P or Q

$\neg P$ not P

$P \Rightarrow Q$ whenever P is true so is Q

Reasoning

$AXIOMS \models P \Rightarrow Q$

A Simple Program

Problem

Compute quotient q and remainder r of integers x divided by y .

```
r:=x; q:=0;  
while r > y do  
    r:=r-y; q:=q+1  
od
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x	y	q	r
8	3	2	2
8	0		
-8	3	0	-8
6	3	1	3

A Simple Program

Problem

Compute quotient q and remainder r of integers x divided by y .

$\{0 < y \wedge 0 \leq x\}$

Precondition

$r := x; q := 0;$

while $r > y$ do

$r := r - y; q := q + 1$

od

x	y	q	r
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A Simple Program

Problem

Compute quotient q and remainder r of integers x divided by y .

$$\{0 < y \wedge 0 \leq x\}$$

Precondition

$r := x; q := 0;$

while $r > y$ do

$r := r - y; q := q + 1$

od

$$\{x = y * q + r \wedge 0 \leq r < y\}$$

Postcondition

x	y	q	r
8	3	2	2
8	0		
-8	3	0	-8
6	3	1	3

Program specification

$\{ P \} \quad S \quad \{ Q \}$

- S Program (fragment)

- P Precondition

Assumed to be true when S starts.

- Q Postcondition

Required to be true when S terminates.

Advantages

- Clear and Unambiguous articulation of **what** program must do.
- Separation of concern: User versus developer.
interface specification.
- Can be formally verified.

Annotated Program

$\{0 < y \wedge 0 \leq x\}$ (1)

$r:=x; q:=0;$ (2)

$\{0 < y \wedge 0 \leq x \wedge r = x \wedge q = 0\}$ (3)

$\{\text{inv} : 0 \leq r \wedge 0 < y \wedge x = y * q + r\}$ (4)

while $\uparrow \quad r \geq y$ do (6)

$\{0 \leq r \wedge 0 < y \wedge x = y * q + r \wedge y \leq r\}$ (7)

$r:=r-y; q:=q+1$ (8)

$\{0 \leq r \wedge 0 < y \wedge x = y * q + r\}$ (9)

od (10)

$\{r < y \wedge 0 \leq r \wedge 0 < y \wedge x = y * q + r\}$ (11)

$\{x = y * q + r \wedge 0 \leq r < y\}$ (12)

Given predicate Q

$Q[e/x]$ denotes Q with x substituted by e

E.g. $x < 0[x + 1/x]$ gives $x + 1 < 0$.

Assignment $\{Q[e/x]\} \quad x := e \quad \{Q\}$

Example: $\{x + 1 < 0\} \quad x := x + 1 \quad \{x < 0\}$

Sequential Composition

$$\frac{\{P\} S_1 \{Q_1\}, \quad Q_1 \Rightarrow Q_2, \quad \{Q_2\} S_2 \{R\}}{\{P\} S_1; S_2 \{R\}}$$

David Gries, [The Science of Programming](#), Springer-Verlag.

Principle of Compositionality

Assembly of Components: $S_1; S_2$

$$\frac{\{P\} S_1 \{Q_1\}, \quad Q_1 \Rightarrow Q_2, \quad \{Q_2\} S_2 \{R\}}{\{P\} S_1; S_2 \{R\}}$$

Meaning of the assembly is derived from the meaning of the components (Frege, Hoare)

Separation of Concerns For any component $\{P\} S \{Q\}$

- Component user only relies on its specification.
- component developer need not know how it is used.
- Meaning of the assembly is unaffected by changes within the component structure till their meaning is unchanged.

[Necule, Lee, Taylor, Morriset]

- Problem domain: extensible programs incorporating externally supplied modules.
- Code carries specification and annotations
- Easy to verify $Code \models Spec$ using annotations. (It is hard to find the annotations.)
- Compilers can add annotations about type safety and memory safety to low level code.

Security Automata Access Control Policies, Information Flow Properties.

“No **Send** after a **Read**”.

Brief History of Program Verification

Hoare Logics

- **First ideas:** (Turing), Floyd , Hoare, Dijkstra
 - Assigning Meaning to Programs (Floyd,1967)
 - On an axiomatic basic for program correctness (Hoare,1969)
 - The discipline of programming, (Dijkstra 1975).
- Extended in 70s and 80' to
 - Procedure calls, Module and Objects,
 - Data and Action Refinement,
 - Concurrent and Distributed Programs
 - Structured Specification Notations: Z, B, RAISE.
- Extended to Reactive Programs using Temporal logic (Pnueli 1977).

Very powerful Methods.

Manual proofs are prohibitively large.

Founders of Formal Verification

First Order Logic for Assertions

Alan Turing



Bob Floyd



Tony Hoare



Edsgar Dijkstra



Temporal Logic for specifying reactive systems

Amir Pnueli



- Acceptance has been low in practice.
 - Cumbersome formulae.
 - Long tedious proofs
 - Lack of training.
- Resurgence of Interest.
 - Key Factor **Tool Support** using
 - **Theorem Provers**
 - **Model Checkers**

Automatic and Interactive Theorem Proving

Theorem Provers are programs which find proof of validity (implications) of logic formulae. E.g.

$$TH(\mathcal{R}) \vdash x > 15 \wedge x - y < 3 \Rightarrow y > 12.$$

Morphology:

- **Proof Checker** User gives the proof. Machine checks that rules are correctly applied.
- **Automatic Theorem Prover** Proof is generated by the Machine.
- **Interactive Theorem Prover** Simple steps are derived by the machine. User makes important steps.
- **Computer assisted proofs** Proof is given by user. Large but mechanical symbolic or numerical calculations done by machine.

Some leading academic Theorem Provers:

- ACL2 (Boyer-Moore, Univ. of Texas)
- PVS (N. Shankar, SRI International, Stanford)
- HOL (Mike Gordon, Cambridge, U.K.)
- COQ (Xavier Leroy, France)

Success stories:

- Pentium SRT Division Algorithm checked using PVS.
- AMD floating point processor verification in ACL2.
(20 million lines of lemmas and their proofs.)
- Verification of Pipelined processor in PVS
- CompCert: Verification of Optimizing C Compiler in Coq.
- Verification of Micro Kernel in Coq.

Theorem Proving in Mathematics

- Four color theorem.
- Jordan Curve Theorem
- Godels first and second completeness theorems.
- [Robbin's Conjecture](#) Open for 60 years.
[Automatically](#) proved by the [EQP](#) theorem prover at Argonne Natiaonal Lab generating human readable proof (published).
- MISAR Mathematical Library. Collection of over 50,000 theorems with checked proofs.

SAT and SMT Solving

SAT Solving

Given a propositional formula, such as $(a \wedge \neg b \vee \neg a \wedge c) \wedge b$, find a truth assignment, such as $(a = f, b = t, c = t)$, which makes the formula true.

- SAT is **NP-complete** in theory.
- Often doable in practice.
CDCL algorithms solve many million formulae.

SMT Solving: Satisfiability Modulo Theories


Theory clauses instead of propositions.

Quantifier free formula from efficiently decidable theory.

- Linear arithmetic: $x_1 + 2 \cdot x_3 \leq y$ over Reals and Integers.
- Bit Vectors and finite precision numbers.
- Uninterpreted functions with equality.


Model Checking

- Model checker is an **algorithm** which, given a system model M and property ϕ , determines whether $M \models \phi$.
- A good model checker will produce a **counter example** if $M \not\models \phi$.



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Applicability

Hardware verification

Verification of Embedded systems controllers

Protocol verification (networks, mobile telephony)

Reactive systems are complex requiring verification.



- **Reactive:** Output depends on interaction with environment.
- **Temporal:** Current output depends on past *sequence* of inputs.
- **Global:** Output from a component may depend on all other components due to interaction.
- **Safety Critical** Often used in applications requiring high degree of reliability.
- Difficult to test.
 - Failure is not repeatable.
 - Cannot collect enough test data.

Verification question: Do **all** behaviours of M satisfy ϕ ?

Models of Concurrent and Reactive Systems

Mutual Exclusion

Initially $y := 0$




- Asynchronous parallelism
- Guarded assignments.

- **Mutual exclusion:** System will not reach a state where both processes are in critical region.
- In *each execution*, whenever either process is in critical region the value of $y = 0$.
- **Starvation-freedom:** If process 1 is trying to enter the critical region, it will eventually succeed.

- **Mutual exclusion:** System will not reach a state where both processes are in critical region.
$$\Box \neg (pc1 = C \wedge pc2 = C)$$
- In *each execution*, whenever either process is in critical region the value of $y = 0$.
$$\Box ((pc1 = C \vee pc2 = C) \Rightarrow y = 0)$$
- **Starvation-freedom:** If process 1 is trying to enter the critical region, it will eventually succeed.
$$\Box (pc1 = T \Rightarrow (\Diamond pc1 = C))$$

Global Automaton for Mutual Exclusion Problem



Models of Reactive Real-time Systems

- Finite State Automata with [Hieararchy](#), [Concurrency](#), [Synchronization](#)
- High Level Programming languages: [Esterel](#), [SCADE/Lustre](#).
- Timed and Hybrid Automata for Embedded Systems Modelling
- Petri Nets, Push Down Automata, Multi Counter Machines ...

Efficient representation and exploration of state graph.

hashing: one bit per state!!

cycle detection

on-the-fly construction of state graphs

partial-order reductions

symmetry reduction

Can typically explore systems with 10^6 to 10^9 states.

Given **ACM systems software award** for year 2001.

- for developing system software that has lasting influence reflected in concepts, commercial aspects or both.
- Other winners: Unix (1983), System R and Ingress (1988), TCP/IP (1991) and Java (2002).

Symbolic Model Checking

Can very often explore systems with 10^{120} states.

Technique: Represent set of states by boolean formulae.
Iteratively compute the set of reachable states.

S_i set of states reachable from *Init* in i or less steps.

$$S_{i+1} = S_i \cup F(S_i)$$

Chain $S_0 = \text{Init} \subset S_1 \subset \dots \subset S_m = S_{m+1}$

S_m is the set of reachable states:

$$M \models \text{invariantly}(P) \text{ iff } S_m \subset P.$$

Initial Idea: [Bryant, MacMillan] BDDs, CTL model checking by iterative computing of fixed points.

SAT solving [Mallik(Princeton)].

Advanced techniques:

- Partitioning and image computation

- Variable ordering (BDD Heuristics)

- Bounded Model Checking

- SAT solving.

- Abstraction and Induction

- Rich specification languages

Leading Symbolic Model Checkers from Universities

Z3 (*Microsoft*), SMV (*CMU*), VIS (*UC Berkeley, UC Colorado*),

NuSMV (*IRST, Trento*), UCLID (*CMU*), ICS (*SRI, Stanford*)

Hardware and Computer Architecture Companies have inhouse model checking tools.

Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Motorola, Siemens, Cadence, Synopsis.

- Intel announced formal verification of floating point unit of Pentium Pro processor (1999). Possibly used formal verification to check parts of design of Pentium IV processor.
- Siemens used Equivalence Checking in validation of ASICs with upto a Million Gates.
- Microsoft provides driver development kit where every third party driver is model checked for health.
- Intel, Motorola, IBM routinely use Model Checking in their design process.

Some model checkers from India

DCVALID (*TIFR*) (Released since 1997),

Word Level ABC verifier (*IITB*) (Not released).

Bebop and SLAM *Microsoft Research India*

DCSYNTH (*TIFR*), Releasing next week!

- Software Model Checking with numerical data.
- Handling systems with complex non-linear dynamics.
- Probabilistic and statistical physics techniques.

We need to interact with other disciplines working on complex systems!!

Thank You.